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Statistics on the Table: The History of Statistical Concepts and Methods
By Stephen M. Stigler. Paperback edition. 2002. Cambridge, MA (Harvard Univ. Press). 1999. ISBN 0-674-00979-7.
ix + 488 pp. $19.95
This is the third printing of a book first published in 1999 by the celebrated historian of statistics whose 1986 book,
The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900, was a runaway success. From its publication
history the present one promises the same. For the current printing a very small number of typographical errors have
been corrected and the back cover carries extracts from a number of positive reviews. Additionally, almost all the
papers included in the collection have been published individually elsewhere, and so (in their original form) have
already been professionally reviewed. For these reasons, and because the present review comes rather late relative to
1999, I have endeavored to give it a more global and more personal nature.
There is an Introduction and 22 chapters, really papers, grouped under five headings: Statistics and Social Science
(five papers); Galtonian Ideas (five papers); Some Seventeenth-Century Explorers (three papers); Questions of Discov-
ery (six papers); and Questions of Standards (three papers). With the exception of Chapter 1, which is new, all chapters
have been revised and updated with some references to material published after the original version appeared. Some
modifications have made style and exposition consistent. There is a unified list of references (pp. 433–476), which
seems to contain a full listing of the author’s own publications on historical topics, and a unified name and subject in-
dex (pp. 479–488) in two columns per page. This is certainly useful, although giving years of birth and death for each
historical individual in the index would also have been helpful. Additionally, citing the original papers themselves as
footnotes at the beginning of each chapter would have made the task for the reader interested in a chapter’s original
version easier, although a list of credits (on pp. 477–478) indicates from which source each chapter originated.
The book is in essence a thematically grouped selection of papers on the history of statistics and, despite Stephen
Stigler’s relative youth since there is promise of much yet to come, the collection is very worthwhile in formalizing the
unifying themes of his historical interests. His focus, geographically, apart from a natural concentration on statistics
in the early United States, has been on the history of statistics in Great Britain and Western Europe. The focal figures
on which his investigations rest are Laplace, Gauss, Quetelet, Bayes, Galton, Edgeworth, Jevons, Karl Pearson, and
R.A. Fisher. A collection of biographical sketches [Heyde and Seneta, 2001] that encompass all of these and many
others mentioned in the book in their social context may be a useful follow-up to the present book for the interested
reader.
Stigler is the leading expert on Quetelet, who he says “possessed a romantic temperament, mathematical talent, and
abundant energy and ambition” (p. 53), qualities with which he might well identify. Quetelet was, inter alia, “father or
stepfather of national and international statistical organizations, including. . . the International Statistical Institute. . .”
(p. 52). As this review is being written, Stigler is, appropriately, President (2003–2005) of the International Statistical
Institute (ISI). The title of Chapter 2 on Quetelet, “The Average Man Is 168 Years Old,” demonstrates the author’s gift
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(Chapter 18) and “The Trial of the Pyx” (Chapter 21).1
In much of his writing, Stigler has been singularly successful in producing methodology that leads to reproduction
of published numerical results, the original methodology being unknown. Quantitative reconstruction of statistical
methodology is possibly the hardest, and perhaps the most rewarding, aspect of the history of statistics, and in this
Stigler has few competitors, and probably no equal. In Chapter 4 (“Jevons on the King–Davenant Law of Demand”),
hitherto rather mysterious quantitative calculations of Jevons are explained using a simple ad hoc algebraic argument.
Jevons’s first empirical work in economics was inspired by an interest in meteorology as a young man in Australia
during the gold rushes. This was also an interest of Quetelet and, parenthetically, of Thomas Jefferson. Jevons is
remembered as an economist and also as a logician. Educated at University College London under Augustus De Mor-
gan, he avoided probability in his work, perhaps because of the difficulties his teacher had had in reviewing Laplace’s
Théorie analytique in its 1820 version and in subsequently bringing its analogue to English-reading audiences.
Another favorite of Stigler’s, also with an economic background, is Edgeworth (Chapter 5), who had a strong
interest in social statistics. The linked economic/social emphases are a frequent attribute in Stigler’s studies, and
manifest themselves not least in the person of Karl Pearson, the founder of the English biometric school of statistics,
originally an applied mathematician, with strong social and literary drives, sometimes called “The Apostle of Free
Thought.” His nemesis, Ronald Aylmer Fisher, also had leanings in related directions, sometimes being described as a
“Scientific Christian” within the Anglican Communion, while Pearson had strong sympathy for Roman Catholicism.
Perhaps, indeed, their attitudes to religion can serve as a metaphor for their scientific differences.2
Stigler is a master storyteller not only in print, but in oral presentation. As such he excelled himself at the meeting of
the ISI in Amsterdam in 1985. Steve’s talk on “The Probability of History” was light-hearted, witty, indeed sparkling,
self-deprecating, and at the same time of substance: a real treat for the assembly of statisticians, and a model on how
to present a talk in the history of science. That presentation was reworked into a paper in the Journal of the American
Statistical Association (ASA) in 1986, and occurs here in revised form as Chapter 13, now titled “John Craig and the
Probability of History.” It contains Stigler’s trademark arguments in historical exposition: use of conditional proba-
bility manipulations. Such techniques range from Bayes’s theorem to Markov chains. One of my favorite statistical
stories also involves the ASA, and occurs within Chapter 8, “The History of Statistics in 1933,” which could well be
subtitled “The American Statistical Association and the Institute of Mathematical Statistics: Sunlight and Shadows” in
tribute to its main theme, and to Steve’s affection for the Victorian era of the British Empire. I refer to the saga of one
Horace Secrist and his incisively named book The Triumph of Mediocrity in Business, published in 1933. Poor Secrist
labored mightily, and to little effect except ridicule, hoist as he was on the petard of the Galtonian regression trap
in his statistical analysis of economic data. Regression, the central idea of Stigler’s Section II, and more specifically
regression to the mean, one of the trickiest ideas of statistics, is a rich and favorite vein, which he mines repeatedly
and to considerable effect.
The year 1933, with the coming of Hitler to power, was crucial in the history of Europe, and in the history of prob-
ability, with the appearance of A.N. Kolmogorov’s Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, and its successful
and now universally used axiomatization of probability theory. Some would argue, however, that to dismiss (in the
same Chapter 8, p. 159) Erhard Tornier’s attempt at axiomatization in his book Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeit-
srechnung of the same year, as “forgettable” in comparison with Kolmogorov’s, is a rather severe judgment. Tornier’s
book was never translated, but it was not completely ignored by mathematicians in the United States after World War
II. Tornier had in fact been a coauthor of William Feller. Some mathematical and statistical work emanating from
Germany during the Nazi era is forgotten not only because of its long unavailability outside the German sphere, but
also because of the implicit or explicit political associations of its authors.
1 For those who have not encountered these articles in their previous incarnation: Maria Agnesi was an Italian mathematician, and the “witch”
is the “Cauchy” probability density function; while the “Trial of the Pyx” is the actual name for the last stage of an ancient sampling scheme for
quality control in coinage production at the London Mint. In fact, the “witch” note has partly to do with the antipathy between Cauchy and Irenée-
Jules Bienaymé, who discovered what is usually (and inappropriately) called Chebyshev’s Inequality. Bienaymé, a French statistical contemporary
of the Belgian Quetelet, has been one of the foci of the work of the reviewer [Heyde and Seneta, 1977].
2 Parenthetically, I would put the beginning of mathematical statistics as a discipline at 1900, with Pearson’s paper on the chi-squared goodness
of fit statistic.
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One is that Evgenii Evgenievich Slutsky (Slutskii) (1880–1948) may have anticipated Kolmogorov. He was born in
the same year as the great analyst and probabilist Sergei Natanovich Bernstein (1880–1968), whose own attempt at
axiomatization is widely mentioned (p. 159), if hardly well known. Slutsky is well known in his own right in econo-
metric theory, and through probabilistic results such as Slutsky’s theorem. Like that of Bernstein and Kolmogorov,
much of his work is available in western European languages.
Stephen Stigler’s style of statistical historiography pays much attention to the sociology of science and of statistics
in the broad sense, in the tradition of Robert K. Merton (1910–2003). Stigler’s Law of Eponymy states that “No
scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer,” and Chapter 14 is devoted to this topic. (I once asked
Steve if this law held in the specific case of itself: but, good-naturedly as always, he declined to confirm or deny!) In
discussing aspects of this phenomenon, Chapter 14 cites (on p. 283) the interesting occurrence of a challenge to the
eponymous honoring of Chebyshev (in favor of Bienaymé) made by a countryman of the celebrated Russian. This
reviewer should, however, point out that, although as one of the authors of [Heyde and Seneta, 1977] he was born in
“the Ukraine,” being of western Ukrainian origin he has no special geographical affinity with Chebyshev. There is,
however, a linguistic and cultural contiguity, which has enabled him to complement Stigler’s own geographical sphere
of study by focusing largely on Russian-language contributions to probability and statistics in the 19th century.
Like its predecessor, Chapter 15 (“Who Discovered Bayes’s Theorem”) displays another aspect of Stigler’s ap-
proach to historical questions: the attempted solution of historical mysteries through clever detective work lightened
by whimsical asides (as on p. 295: “He saw Hartley’s wife even more frequently, although he recorded few details of
the ‘shorthand lessons’ he gave her, other than that ‘she seemed much pleased with it’ ”) and occasional probabilistic
surprises (as on p. 299: “I propose to solve the problem with Bayes’s Theorem”). Chapter 16 (“Daniel Bernoulli,
Leonhard Euler, and Maximum Likelihood”), much revised from its original version of 1997, is another attempt to
sort out priority in the matter of maximum likelihood. There is new material (pp. 312 ff) in particular on Lagrange
and Lambert.
Chapter 19 (“Karl Pearson and Degrees of Freedom”), first published in 1992, also contains new material, and
displays another characteristic of Stigler’s work: The desire to set the record, finally, straight. He begins by citing
what is usually believed about the controversy between Pearson and Fisher, and then says, “However, as is often the
case in history, a closer investigation shows a more complicated picture.” We are then taken through early manifes-
tation of quasi-independence in Pearson’s working with restricted contingency tables, detective work on actual data
analysis, with many tables displayed, a detailed quantitative analysis of the related work of contemporaries and critics,
concluding with a very positive perception of Karl Pearson’s quality of mind.3
Since Chapter 1 (“Karl Pearson and the Cambridge Economists”) has not been published previously, it deserves
more extensive review here. The aim of Pearson and his co-workers in 1910 was to test the hypothesis that “a primary
evil associated with drink was the damage it did to children of families with one or more drunken parents,” using
a modern statistical analysis. The issue was a version of the nature-versus-nurture debate, the aim being to test the
effect of environment. The study, a characteristically careful one, resulted in the tentative conclusion that children of
alcoholics were statistically indistinguishable from similarly situated children of nonalcoholics. The Times in London
ran a generally approving story about it, but in due course there was negative reaction to the conclusion. Criticisms
were published in the Times and elsewhere, with responses from Pearson. The first of the Cambridge economists to
criticize was the eminent Alfred Marshall, followed by John Maynard Keynes, and finally by Arthur Cecil Pigou,
a devotee of Marshall’s who had succeeded him in the Chair of Political Economy at Cambridge in 1908.
In his conclusion (pp. 47–50) Stigler encapsulates the issues, noting that Pearson failed to appreciate the one sig-
nificant effect, evidence for what became known as the fetal alcoholism syndrome, by finding a slightly higher infant
mortality rate for drinking parents. Pigou’s argument, in support of Marshall’s position, was carefully logical, leading
to the conclusion that children of the whole body of alcoholics in the country are probably on average inferior to
children of the whole body of nonalcoholics. This conclusion would seem to be at variance with Pearson’s finding that
the mature capacities of children of alcoholics and nonalcoholics do not differ, given the same childhood environment
3 No doubt to the delight of junior students of statistics whose bane is the interpretation of P -value, Pearson seems to have thought of it as the
probability that the null hypothesis is true. As a small comment on the author’s fine writing style, phrases (p. 339 in this chapter, and similarly
elsewhere) such as “the model was introduced and correctly fit to a class” do not sound right, and the word “fit” could in such places be replaced to
advantage by “fitted”; but this perception may be the result of literary atrophy of this reviewer.
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Marshall’s and Pigou’s intuitive arguments, and exposes the apparent contradiction as an example of the aggregation
paradox in statistics. He quantifies Pigou’s assumptions and conclusions and argues algebraically and graphically in
terms of regression in the guise of conditional expectation to unravel Pigou’s logic.
Here is the algebraic essence of his remarkably simple argument. Suppose (X,Y ) have jointly a bivariate normal
distribution (so the regression of, say, Y on X, that is, the conditional expectation E(Y | X = x), is linear in x).
Suppose likewise that (V,W ) have jointly a bivariate normal distribution. Assume that E(X) = E(V ), that Var(X) =
Var(Y ), Var(V ) = Var(W), and that Corr(X,Y ) = Corr(V ,W) > 0. Then the assumption that E(Y | X = i) < E(W |
V = i) for all i implies that E(X | Y = r) > E(V | W = r) for all r . The bivariate normality, with the associated
moment assumptions, permits the inversion of the conditional expectation relationship, which is the nub of the matter.
The quality and effervescence of Stigler’s writing cannot help but give a magical patina to statistics and its history.
Can anybody with a passing acquaintance with statistical history not be delighted with even occasional allusions
to things such as the frequent flutterings in Bayesian dovecotes of recent decades? This whimsical literary style,
Stigler’s masterful way of telling a story, his quantitative reconstructions, and his compelling investigation of historical
mysteries, motivated by a desire to set the historical record straight, make Statistics on the Table required reading for
anyone with an interest in the history of statistics.
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Gauss: Titan of Science
By G. Waldo Dunnington. Revised edition, with contributions by Jeremy Gray and Fritz-Egbert Dohse. Washington,
DC (Mathematical Association of America). 2003. ISBN 0-88385-547-X. 602 pp. $49.95
Dunnington’s excellent biography appeared in 1955 (at that time it cost $6; now it is $49.95) and has been out of
print for nearly half a century. A more recent Gauss biographer, W.K. Bühler, called Dunnington’s work “by far the
most important” of the major Gauss biographies. Indeed, the book contains a mass of material, collected tirelessly
by Dunnington over almost three decades. Among many other items of interest, it includes lists of books borrowed
by Gauss when he was a student as well as courses delivered by him, a genealogy, and Gauss’s will. Of course, after
half a century some details need to be corrected and the views remain those of an American of a certain period and
background. For example, Dunnington asserts that at the beginning of the 19th century, Germany was in possession
of her three greatest geniuses: Goethe, Gauss, and Wagner. In the reviewer’s opinion, Beethoven (1770–1827) would
have fit Dunnington’s scheme better than Wagner (1813–1883): he was a contemporary of Gauss and a “classic”
genius (p. 3). Dunnington, a professor of German (not of mathematics), shows Gauss as a human being, as well as the
mathematical aspects of Gauss’s life. The work contains a very good index (pp. 507–537) and is well illustrated with
almost 50 images.
The reprint is enlarged, first by personal reminiscences about Dunnington by Fritz Dohse (pp. xxvii–xxxix) and
second by additional materials by Jeremy Gray. The latter include an introduction (pp. xix–xxvi), an annotated bib-
liography with 105 titles, and most importantly the English translation of Gauss’s famous Diary (“Mathematisches
